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Interest Rates Are Near Zero
 Charles Carlstrom and Andrea Pescatori
This Economic Commentary explains the concerns that are associated with the combination of deﬂ  ation, low economic 
activity, and zero nominal interest rates and describes how monetary policy might be conducted in such a situation. We 
argue that avoiding expectations of deﬂ  ation is key and that the monetary authority needs to demonstrate an unequivo-
cal commitment to preventing deﬂ  ation. We also argue that price-level targeting might be a good device for communicat-
ing such a commitment. 
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While business cycles are inevitable, there is quite broad 
agreement among economists and policymakers that mon-
etary policy can and should be used to damp ﬂ  uctuations in 
economic activity. But some ﬂ  uctuations can occur in an un-
usual economic environment in which the traditional tools 
of monetary policy become useless. When short-term inter-
est rates are at or near zero, for example, monetary policy 
cannot be implemented in the usual way—by adjusting these 
short-term interest rates. If policymakers want to lower rates 
in such an environment, they must look for alternative ways 
of conducting policy. With the federal funds rate hover-
ing just above zero since December 2008, the current U.S. 
economic situation is a case in point. To conduct monetary 
policy under these conditions, the Federal Reserve has had 
to turn to a new strategy and new tools. 
Some economists have pointed to another problem that an 
environment of near-zero interest rates could pose for mon-
etary policy. They suggest that the inability to lower interest 
rates could allow a sudden and unexpected fall in the de-
mand for goods and services to push the economy into a de-
ﬂ  ationary spiral, a situation in which falling prices and falling 
output feed upon each other. The fear is that a negative de-
mand shock that pushes down prices (in short, a deﬂ  ationary 
shock) could further decrease output, thereby accentuating 
the deﬂ  ationary process. This additional deﬂ  ation will then 
lead to further output decline. Paul Krugman, the economist 
and New York Times columnist, has dubbed this downward 
spiral a “black hole,” from where there is no return.1
This Economic Commentary explains the concerns that are 
associated with the combination of deﬂ  ation, low economic 
activity, and zero nominal interest rates and describes some 
of the ways in which monetary policy might be conducted 
in this situation. We conclude by emphasizing that to be ef-
fective in an environment of zero short-term nominal interest 
rates, monetary policy needs to be unequivocally committed 
to avoiding expectations of deﬂ  ation. We also argue that 
price-level targeting might be a good device for communicat-
ing such a commitment. While this policy prescription fol-
lows from the assumption that the zero interest rate bound 
is a consequence of a negative demand shock hitting the 
economy, it is worth stressing that falling prices can also be 
the consequence of a supply shock, namely particularly high 
productivity growth (not a bad thing!). This would clearly 
call for different policy actions than the ones described here.
Zero Interest Rates and the Black Hole
The special problem deﬂ  ation might pose in times of 
near-zero nominal interest rates has to do with what could 
happen to real interest rates in such an environment and the 
effect that they could have on economic activity. 
Consider, for example, a ﬁ  rm that decides to borrow money 
at a stated, or nominal, interest rate of 7 percent. If prices, 
including the ﬁ  rm’s product price, are expected to grow at 
2 percent per year, then the real cost of borrowing for the 
ﬁ  rm (the real interest rate) is 5 percent per year. In principle, 
the real rate should be determined only by the saving and 
investment decisions of market participants, plus adjust-
ments for risks, not monetary policy. In fact, a permanent 
change in expected inﬂ  ation, say from 2 percent to 1 percent, 
will change only the nominal rate (in this case from 
7 percent to 6 percent) and leave the real rate unchanged. 
However, inﬂ  ation expectations do not change instanta-
neously. Because they adjust over time, a policy move that 
decreases the nominal interest rate will also, in the short 
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is that doing so will drive up their demand and therefore the 
price of these securities. This will decrease their yield and 
therefore lower long-term interest rates. Lower long-term 
interest rates will end up stimulating investment and the 
economy. The assumption underlying this approach is that 
banks will not simply sit on the cash they receive from the 
Fed in exchange for the long-term securities, and the supply 
of money in circulation will actually rise in consequence. 
That is, banks cannot view long-term and short-term gov-
ernment securities as perfect substitutes. Otherwise, they 
will not attempt to buy other long-term securities or loan 
out this extra cash. 
While evidence suggests that longer-term interest rates fell 
with the announcement that the Fed would purchase long-
term securities, the challenge for this policy is to have a large 
and lasting impact. That impact rests on a couple of assump-
tions, one of which is that the markets for short- and long-
term bonds are segmented from each other; that is, short-
term and long-term securities are not good substitutes for one 
another. With segmented markets, the supply and demand 
schedules for loanable funds in each market are separate. 
But even if markets are segmented, over time, traders will 
be “tempted out of their preferred market segment” by the 
lure of higher expected returns. By decreasing long-term 
rates, the risk-adjusted return for short-term treasuries 
increases. Long-term interest rates will start to increase as 
investors substitute away from long-term securities to short-
term securities, or equivalently, zero-interest-earning excess 
reserves. The extra money pumped into the system by long-
term security purchases may quickly wind up back in banks’ 
reserve accounts. 
Another way to think about this is that eventually long-term 
interest rates are eventually determined by market funda-
mentals, namely long-term inﬂ  ation expectations in conjunc-
tion with expected long-term economic growth. Long-run 
growth is driven by nonmonetary factors. 
Even while purchases of long-term treasuries may be affect-
ing long-term interest rates, it is not easy to assess the size of 
the purchase that is required to affect yields in the desired 
manner or the timing of those effects. 
In terms of sheer numbers, quantitative easing was domi-
nated by purchases of mortgage backed securities (MBS) 
and not long-term government securities after interest rates 
effectively hit zero. The idea behind purchasing MBS is that 
the real impact of the operation will be much larger. This is 
because MBS are nowhere near as closely substitutable with 
short-term securities as government-issued long-term securi-
ties are, which implies that the market segmentation between 
short-term government securities and private MBS will 
persist for a much longer period of time. The evidence does 
suggest that these purchases have been successful in lowering 
mortgage rates. 
run, temporarily decrease the real rate. The decrease in the 
real rate will increase the willingness of banks to lend and 
ﬁ  rms to borrow. This extra lending will then temporarily 
stimulate output. In this scenario, a central bank could eas-
ily counteract a deﬂ  ationary shock that reduces prices and 
expected inﬂ  ation (which could potentially raise the real rate 
temporarily and depress the economy) by lowering the real 
rate, or equivalently, by lowering the nominal rate by an 
amount greater than the fall in prices. 
But if a deﬂ  ationary shock occurs when nominal rates are 
already at or close to zero, policymakers cannot counteract 
the shock by further lowering the nominal interest rate. Even 
if long-term inﬂ  ation is well moored, the deﬂ  ationary shock 
may still lower short-term inﬂ  ation expectations and therefore 
increase the real interest rate. The increase in the real rate 
may further depress investment, consumption, and aggregate 
demand, causing prices to fall further. This second bout of 
deﬂ  ation will increase the real rate again and exacerbate the 
decline in output and the original deﬂ  ationary shock. 
It is important to stress that the extreme version of this 
scenario—the black hole Krugman refers to—is unlikely to 
occur, partly because ﬁ  rms anticipating a drop in demand 
will eventually cut production enough to stop excess supply. 
Nevertheless, our inability to offset a deﬂ  ationary shock could 
conceivably prolong a period of deﬂ  ation and falling output.
Will Quantitative Easing Work?
Many argue that reserve targeting (or quantitative easing 
when it is done in a zero-interest-rate environment), can 
still stimulate the economy when short-term interest rates 
are zero. But if quantitative easing is implemented through 
the purchase of short-term securities, this policy is almost 
certainly doomed to failure. 
Since banks’ cash reserves and short-term securities are 
perfect substitutes when nominal interest rates are at zero, 
banks have no incentive to lend the money out. They are 
likely to simply substitute the cash they receive from the 
central bank for the securities they were holding in reserves. 
Therefore, the supply of money in circulation (that is, one 
common and useful deﬁ  nition of it, M1, which is currency 
held by the public plus demand and other checkable depos-
its) is not affected. To affect M1, banks need to lend the cash 
out to the private sector, which in turn will redeposit part of 
this cash into checking accounts, thereby increasing money 
in circulation. Because open market operations will not 
increase the money supply when short-term interest rates 
are zero, they can’t be used to increase either real economic 
activity or prices. 
But this reasoning applies to the purchase of short-term 
government securities. In March 2009, the Federal Reserve 
embarked on a program of quantitative easing by purchasing 
longer-term securities to stimulate the economy. Unlike short-
term securities, these still had a positive rate of interest. The 
longer-term securities included agency mortgage-backed secu-
rities, agency debt, and longer-term government securities. 
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As we have seen, when short-term rates are zero, monetary 
policymakers must look beyond standard tools to inﬂ  uence 
inﬂ  ation and output. But they have another tool not yet 
mentioned. The FOMC can communicate, usually through 
speeches and its policy statements, information that is meant 
to inﬂ  uence expectations about future changes in the federal 
funds rate. Expectations of future monetary policy can 
increase future money growth and hence expected inﬂ  ation. 
Increased inﬂ  ationary expectations will lower real interest 
rates. This is one way of understanding the FOMC’s current 
language that there are likely to be “exceptionally low levels 
of the federal funds rate for an extended period.”
We have discussed the importance of expected inﬂ  ation in 
counteracting a deﬂ  ationary spiral. If interest rates are at 
zero, increases in expected inﬂ  ation will decrease today’s real 
interest rate, stimulating both the real economy and prices. 
Using communication to boost future inﬂ  ation expectations 
in this environment requires policymakers to promise that 
they will “err” on the side of keeping interest rates low even 
after the economy starts to recover. In essence, this future 
inﬂ  ation will stimulate the economy today and actually 
increase money today. 
Perhaps the best way for the central bank to communicate 
that it plans to deliver on its promise to “err” on the side of 
future inﬂ  ation whenever deﬂ  ationary shocks hit is to develop 
a simple rule that the public can easily monitor to see whether 
the central bank is fulﬁ  lling its promise. One simple rule is a 
price-level target. With a price-level target, the central bank 
commits to sticking to a given path for the level of prices over 
some horizon. If prices start rising faster than a prespeciﬁ  ed 
rate, policymakers must lower inﬂ  ation in the future to get the 
price level back to the target. Similarly, if there is a deﬂ  ation-
ary shock, the central bank must inﬂ  ate in the future because 
it has to bring the price level back up (see ﬁ  gure 1).
Instead of a price-level target, many central banks around the 
world have adopted inﬂ  ation targeting, where inﬂ  ation over 
a period of around two years is on average kept constant. A 
credible inﬂ  ation target will anchor inﬂ  ation expectations over 
the speciﬁ  ed horizon, which, by deﬁ  nition, is enough to avoid 
expected deﬂ  ations and increases in the real rate. 
However, there is an important difference between an inﬂ  a-
tion target and a price-level target. An inﬂ  ation target “lets 
bygones be bygones,” while a price-level target corrects for 
past misses. If prices fall on a year-over-year basis, a price-
level target requires the central bank to reinﬂ  ate prices until 
they are back to the target. An inﬂ  ation target requires only 
that the rate of inﬂ  ation be returned to its target rate from 
the present onward. 
A price-level target is essentially a promise that a deﬂ  ation-
ary shock today will increase inﬂ  ation in the future and thus 
expected inﬂ  ation today. This promise of future inﬂ  ation 
will lower real interest rates even when short-term nominal 
rates are zero. Long-term inﬂ  ation is still pinned down as it 
1. Inﬂ  ation and Price-Level Responses to Different 
Targeting Regimes
is with an inﬂ  ation target. One of the rare positive elements of 
the recent period of turmoil has been the stability of any mea-
sure of inﬂ  ation expectations (survey or market-based), especial-
ly at medium and long horizons. It is an open question whether 
a central bank targeting the price level would have the same 
credibility, so that long-term inﬂ  ation expectations remained 
well-anchored.
One drawback of a price-level target is that it necessitates stimu-
lating the economy whenever prices fall—no matter what the 
cause. For example, an expansion driven by a positive supply 
shock would naturally put downward pressure on prices and 
upward pressure on the real rate, but few economists believe 
that monetary policy accommodation is helpful in such a situa-
tion. An inﬂ  ation target can potentially be changed, to respond 
to unusual economic conditions,but a price-level target has the 
advantage of responding according to a very simple and easy-to-
understand rule. 
Avoiding the Zero Lower Bound
Going forward, it is important to try and minimize the chances 
that short-term interest rates will hit zero in the future. One 
way of doing this is for the Fed to increase its implicit long-term 
inﬂ  ation target. Instead of the 1.5 percent–2 percent range for 
long-term inﬂ  ation that most market participants currently ex-
pect the Fed to pursue, John Williams of the San Francisco Fed 
argues that the Fed’s long-term inﬂ  ation target may have to be 
increased to the 2 percent–4 percent range. This will increase the 
long-term federal funds rate, thereby giving the Fed extra “ammu-
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But instead of a higher long-term inﬂ  ation target, a price-
level target is another way to mitigate the chances that a zero 
lower interest rate bound will be hit in the future. (Recall 
that a price-level target still implies a given long-term inﬂ  a-
tion rate.) If the economy is hit by a major deﬂ  ationary 
shock when nominal rates are close to zero, a price-level 
target has a clear advantage over an inﬂ  ation target. If mon-
etary policy aims at stabilizing prices, policymakers must cre-
ate future short- to medium-term inﬂ  ation to correct for past 
misses. The future inﬂ  ation promised by a price-level target 
will increase expected inﬂ  ation over the short- to medium-
term and therefore increase nominal rates, helping to insure 
that the zero lower bound for interest rates is never reached. 
Undeniably, the zero bound produces problems for mon-
etary policy, but these problems are not insurmountable. 
Communicating future monetary policy is the best way for 
monetary policymakers to increase inﬂ  ation expectations 
when short-term interest rates are constrained by a zero 
lower bound. Furthermore, a price-level target is something 
that can potentially be used to enhance this communication. 
An appropriate price-level target can also reduce the likeli-
hood of ever hitting the zero bound to begin with.
Footnotes
1. Although we focus on deﬂ  ation, we recognize that some 
people are concerned about inﬂ  ation risk in the economy as 
well. Our focus on deﬂ  ation is not intended to express a view 
on the likelihood of one outcome as being greater than another.
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